Analysing a No-Damage Occurrence: Building a Cause Tree That Survives Review

Mur de pense-bêtes vierges reliés par des fils noirs formant un réseau ramifié de branches causales

An approach ending with a go-around under the stabilization threshold, an aircraft taking off without a scratch, and an internal report of a few lines concluding with a « loss of situational awareness by the crew. » A few months later, the same sequence repeats, on the same airfield, with another crew. The cause-and-effect tree is designed to make this ending impossible: it forces us to go back to where the narrative usually stops, and it provides the reviewer with criteria to assert that a branch was cut too soon.

The no-damage event is the only complete material

An accident destroys part of its own evidence: dislocated airframe, unavailable actors, investigation conducted under official constraints and communication rules. A no-damage event preserves everything. The aircraft is intact and its recordings readable, the crew can be reached within the hour, the company’s configuration that day—crews, maintenance, dispatch, weather, schedule—can be reconstructed piece by piece. It is the only case where both the objective trace and the actors’ reasoning are available.

This wealth has a very short lifespan, and the curve varies depending on the source. Flight parameters, maintenance messages, and technical recordings do not degrade; they are erased all at once, either at the end of the recording loop or on the next flight, depending on the equipment. The actors’ reasoning, on the other hand, degrades continuously: as soon as the first review of a report takes place, memory reorganizes around what is now known about the outcome. What was once uncertainty becomes a sign that should have been noticed.

Degradation of the account versus the stability of recorded dataAs a function of the time elapsed since the occurrence, a solid curve represents the recorded data, which remain at a constant level, and a dashed curve represents the accounts of those involved, which start from a higher level and fall sharply from the first hours.information exploitabletime since the occurrencerecorded dataaccounts of those involvedfirst hours
Collecting accounts is urgent; collecting data is merely essential. Parameters stay identical as long as they exist; the reasoning of those involved, however, is rewritten around the known outcome from the first replays. So interview before analysing.

When something goes wrong but no one gets hurt, it’s the best time to investigate because all the evidence is still there. But memories fade fast, so you need to talk to people right away. The technical data stays the same until it gets erased, but people’s stories change as they try to make sense of what happened.

A Boeing 737 on a short runway in hot weather (35°C, runway 1,800m) had a rejected takeoff at V1. The crew reported “loss of situational awareness.” Three months later, another 737 on the same runway had the same issue. The investigation found that both crews missed a critical maintenance note about brake wear, which wasn’t properly highlighted in the pre-flight briefing.

Hence a counterintuitive rule: the decision to conduct an in-depth analysis is based on the event’s potential, not on its observed severity. The useful criterion is the plausible severity of a very close combination—one more parameter, one fewer barrier. A company that triggers its trees based on damage will only analyze cases where the evidence has already disappeared.

Establishing the facts before drawing the first arrow

The quality of a tree is entirely determined before the first stroke. A node is a fact: something observable, dated, attributed to an actor or a system, and verifiable by a citable source. Three formulations immediately disqualify a node. Judgment—“insufficient coordination,” “poor-quality briefing”—is not a fact but a disguised conclusion, and it prevents going further back. The compound fact—“the crew continued an unstabilized approach in an incomplete configuration”—hides two or three facts that do not share the same antecedents. The negation—“the crew did not announce”—is only acceptable if a prescribed action existed, and in that case, what was done instead must be written.

The material comes from four sources that are not mixed: recorded traces, the documentation applicable at the time of the facts (not the version in force at the time of the analysis), external conditions and the day’s schedule, and finally, interviews. These are conducted separately and never report back to the interviewee what another person said: otherwise, you collect a common narrative, i.e., a single testimony.

The deliverable of this phase is not the tree, but the timeline: the facts aligned on a time axis, each with its source. It reveals things that the tree masks—a delay abnormally long between two actions, a decision made before the information supposedly justifying it was available, two facts that everyone thought were simultaneous but were actually separated by several minutes.

Fact timeline of an unstabilised approachUn axe de temps portant cinq faits datés alternés au-dessus et au-dessous : descente tardive, vitesse haute, sortie tardive du train, franchissement de la porte de stabilisation, remise de gaz. Une zone grisée entre le troisième et le quatrième fait matérialise la fenêtre de décision.descente tardivevitesse hautetrain tardifporte franchiego-arounddecision windowtemps
The timeline is built before the tree and can be read without it. It shows the intervals, and therefore the moments when an action was still possible. The shaded area is the only part of the flight where a different decision would have changed the outcome.

The grammar of the tree: necessity, sufficiency, antecedent

The construction starts from the last fact—the one that closes the sequence—and works backward. At each node, a single question, word for word: what was needed for this fact to occur, and was that alone sufficient? Depending on the answer, three structures—and only three—are obtained.

The sequence: a necessary and sufficient antecedent produces the fact. The conjunction: several antecedents, each necessary, none sufficient alone—dominant structure of no-damage events, and the reason why they remain rare despite frequent deviations. The disjunction: a single antecedent produces several facts, which almost always signals a high-level common cause.

The three basic structures of a cause treeThree panels separated by vertical lines: the sequence shows one node producing another, the conjunction shows two nodes converging on one, the disjunction shows one node producing two distinct facts.sequenceconjonctiondisjonctionone fact, one antecedenttwo necessary factsone fact, two consequences
Three structures, not four: anything that fits none of them is a badly written fact. A node that cannot be linked cleanly is almost always a compound fact that needs splitting, or a judgement that needs replacing by an observation.

To build a good cause tree, you need to ask two questions at every step: “Was this the only thing that could have caused it?” and “Was this alone enough to cause it?” If the answer is yes to both, it’s a direct cause. If multiple things were needed, it’s a combination. If one thing leads to multiple outcomes, it’s a common cause.

The word “necessary” has a strict and counterfactual meaning here: without this fact, and all other things being equal, the next fact does not occur. The word “sufficient” has an equally strict meaning: this fact alone, in the context of the day, produces the next one. Crossing the two gives a sorting grid that resolves most session disputes.

Sorting grid for a candidate fact by necessity and sufficiencyTwo-way matrix. A fact that is necessary and sufficient on its own becomes an isolated antecedent. A fact that is necessary but not sufficient on its own requires a co-factor to be found, hence a conjunction. A fact that is not necessary remains a circumstance and leaves the tree.suffisant seulinsuffisant seulnecessarynot necessaryisolated antecedentconjonction :a co-factor is missingcircumstance, not antecedent
The shaded row is where weather, generic fatigue and “operational pressure” end up. Until it has been shown that without them the next fact does not occur, they are circumstances: they describe the setting, they do not hold up a branch.

The tests that eliminate comfortable branches

A comfortable branch is one that ends on a node that no one will contest and that no one can correct. “Non-application of the procedure,” “lack of vigilance,” “operator error”: these three formulations close more branches in companies than all the others combined. Four tests are enough to reopen them.

The four validity tests of a branch and what they invalidate
Test Question asked at the node What it invalidates
Necessity If this fact is removed, does the next fact still occur? Circumstances promoted to causes because they were present that day.
Suffisance Does this fact alone produce the next, or has a co-factor remained implicit? Linear sequences that hide a conjunction, and therefore a missing barrier.
Substitution Would a qualified professional, in the same context and with the same information, have acted differently? Blaming the individual when the answer is “no”: the cause then lies in the context.
Stopping point Does the terminal node point to something the operator can act on? Branches closed on a state of mind, a character trait or fate.

After a runway excursion, an investigation concluded with “pilot error.” The substitution test revealed that 80% of pilots in the same situation would have also missed the wet runway warning due to a poorly designed checklist. The real cause was the checklist design, not the pilot.

The substitution test is the least understood. It does not exonerate anyone; it shifts the question. If qualified professionals placed in the same context would have mostly done the same thing, the context is the cause, and the measure must focus on it. If the answer is clearly “no,” it remains to explain why that actor had different information, workload, or training that day—which is still a system question.

Trap: the hindsight bias contaminates the tree through vocabulary, not conclusions. As soon as a node contains “should have,” “did not see,” or “neglected,” the known outcome has slipped into the description of the facts, and the entire branch above becomes useless: you are no longer tracing the antecedents of a fact, you are building a case. Second trap, less visible: the tree built in plenary with an event actor in the room becomes a negotiation, and the branches that are inconvenient are politely cut, by consensus.

Good reflex: have the tree reviewed by someone who did not participate in its construction, giving them only the timeline and the sources—not the report, not the conclusions. Ask them to reconstruct the first two levels alone. If they differ from yours, it is not they who are wrong: your nodes contain judgments that only the original group can decode. Also impose the writing rule: one node, one sentence, one subject, one action verb, one date, one source.

From the last node to the corrective action

A correct tree rarely produces a single cause, and always several points of action. Each actionable terminal node—and only that one—leads to a measure. The quality of the measure is assessed on a known and rarely applied scale: eliminate the hazard, physically prevent the sequence, detect and alert, prescribe by procedure, and as a last resort, inform or train. An analysis where all actions fall into the last two steps has not gone high enough: it asks the actors to absorb a problem that the system sends them intact.

Path of a deviation through successive barriersFour vertical barriers in cross-section. The first three each have an opening and let through a dashed path originating from an initial deviation; the fourth is solid and stops the path.initial deviationconceptionproceduredetectioncrewthe last one held
In a no-damage occurrence, the last barrier held — it is almost always the crew. The tree must therefore focus on the first three, the ones that let it through: they are the ones that will still be open on the day the last one is busy elsewhere.

Three mentions make an action verifiable: a designated responsible party by function, a deadline, and an effectiveness criterion defined before implementation. The latter is the one that is skipped. “Reminder to crews” has no criterion, so there is no way to know if the event can recur; “removal of the double possible interpretation in the approach chart, verified by cross-checking” has one. The effectiveness review is part of the analysis: as long as it has not taken place, the file is not closed, it is pending. This is an area where practitioner feedback is more valuable than form templates.

What a reviewer will look for in your tree

Before transmitting, read your tree backward: start from each terminal node and go back to the event, saying the chain out loud. Any link that requires an “and then of course” is a missing link. Then count your terminal nodes: if there is only one, you have probably built a sequence where there was a conjunction.

Three people in a control room analyze data on multiple monitors, with a whiteboard showing a cause tree diagram.
Structured analysis prevents recurring failures in complex systems.

Finally, check in your documentation three points that vary greatly from one operator to another: who decides that an event will be the subject of an in-depth analysis, who validates the corrective actions and within what deadline, who can close the file after an effectiveness review. Also look at how your manual links safety analysis and possible disciplinary action: it is the clause that determines whether your colleagues will talk to you next time.

The framework changes with the size of the operator. In a small structure, the person conducting the analysis often flew, programmed, or maintained the aircraft in question: they are both investigator and possible antecedent. The solution is not to abandon the tree but to make this conflict visible—name in the file the nodes where the analyst is a party, and entrust the review of those branches to someone external. A large structure has the opposite problem: the analyst does not know the airfield or local habits and takes for a fact what is only the official description of the work. A node written according to the procedure instead of what actually happened produces a coherent but false tree: it describes a flight that did not take place, and the measures it generates correct a behavior that no one had.

There remains a gray area that the method does not resolve. The tree goes back as long as it finds facts, and it regularly ends up designating a program trade-off, an equipment choice, or a sizing decision—decisions made outside the safety manager’s scope. The method requires writing these nodes; it does not say who will carry them. Knowing how to formulate this level without turning it into a trial is what is evaluated in a candidate for a flight safety position, far more than mastery of the formalism, and it is what is worked on in training programs dedicated to the safety management system.

This article describes a method, not an obligation: the applicable texts, the operator’s approved documentation, and the procedures of its safety management system prevail in all circumstances over what is written here.

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