Approach Ban: At What Point Does Weather Prohibit Continuing

A pilot and co-pilot in a cockpit at night, assessing low visibility during an approach, with fog obscuring the runway.

Eight thousand feet, descending, and approach control reports a runway visual range of four hundred fifty metres on a runway where your minima require five hundred fifty. The question is not whether the runway will eventually appear: it is whether you still have the right to go and look. The two major regulatory systems answer yes or no from a point on the flight path that they do not place in the same location, and from a visibility that they do not define in the same way. A crew that switches regime partway through a career almost always carries over the wrong reflex.

A barrier set on the information, not on the weather

The approach ban does not prohibit landing in bad weather. It prohibits beginning, or continuing, an instrument approach when the value officially transmitted for the runway concerned is below the applicable minimum. It is a rule about a message, not about a phenomenon. Three variables are enough to describe any version of it: which value counts, at what point on the flight path it stops counting, and what takes over afterwards.

The reasoning behind it is worth recalling, because it explains the shape of the rule. Interrupting a stabilised approach at a few hundred feet because a value has just arrived by radio means triggering an unprepared manoeuvre in the busiest segment of the flight. A go-around at minimums, by contrast, is briefed, configured, expected. The legislator therefore chose to freeze the legal picture at a defined instant: beyond that point, a transmitted deterioration no longer concerns the crew, who already have an escape planned at a known place. The barrier does not protect against fog; it protects against information arriving at the worst possible moment.

What the rule does not touch, in either system, is the terminal test. A legally begun approach confers no right to land. At minimums, the question becomes physical again: can you see what needs to be seen, and do you see it continuously? This second barrier has never been negotiable anywhere, and it is this one, in practice, that produces almost all go-arounds for visibility reasons.

The approach ban is about when you can start or continue an approach based on reported visibility, not the actual weather. Once you pass a certain point in the descent, new visibility reports no longer matter – you just have to see the runway at minimums.

An Airbus A320 on approach to Paris Charles de Gaulle with a 600m RVR minimum passes 1000ft AGL (European system) with a reported 550m RVR. The crew continues to minimums because the barrier has been crossed, even if visibility worsens further. At 200ft, they see the runway lights and land.

Approach ban decision sequenceA transmitted value below the minimum arrives. If the regulatory barrier has not yet been crossed, the approach must be discontinued. If it has, the approach continues to minimums, where the only remaining question is acquisition of the visual reference: landing if it is obtained, go-around if not.Transmitted valuebelow minimumBarrier crossed?Continue to minimumsDiscontinueVisual reference?Go-aroundLandingnoyesnoyes
Both systems share the same mechanics: only the position of the barrier changes. Until it is crossed, the transmitted value governs, and a value below the minimum closes the door. Once crossed, it no longer governs anything: the only test that remains is visual, at minimums.

The European point: one thousand feet above the aerodrome

The value that counts is the RVR transmitted for the intended landing runway. The touchdown zone position is always binding; the midpoint and stop-end positions become binding only for operations that require them, according to the operator’s approved documentation. A value read from a sensor that is not on your runway, or for a position your manual does not make binding, does not enter into the reasoning.

When no RVR is transmitted, the operator converts meteorological visibility into converted visibility, using a coefficient that depends on the lighting available and the time of day. This conversion is bounded by prohibitions that are best known by heart: it is never used for take-off, it is superseded as soon as an RVR exists, and it ceases to be admitted below an RVR threshold of around eight hundred metres — precisely where instrumental measurement becomes irreplaceable and the observer’s eye is no longer enough.

The switch-over point is a height: one thousand feet above the aerodrome. Above it, a value below the minimum prohibits continuing, regardless of distance or configuration. Below it, the approach may be continued to minimums, whatever subsequent transmissions say. And if the value drops again once minimums have been passed, continuing to landing remains possible as long as the required visual reference is acquired and maintained.

The earlier wording, still present in many memories and in a few older manuals, used the outer marker or an equivalent position. The switch to a height is not cosmetic: it detaches the point from ground equipment, making it identical for a non-precision approach, a barometric vertical-guidance approach, or a precision approach. One gesture, one call, whatever the procedure — which, for an airline operating unevenly equipped airfields, is preferable to a rule with variable geometry.

The American point: the final approach fix

The first difference is structural and often surprises: the barrier does not exist for everyone. For general aviation operating under the basic federal rules, no transmitted value prohibits beginning an approach. The only lock is at minimums: a prohibition on descending below the decision altitude or minimum descent altitude without being in a position to make a normal landing, without flight visibility reaching the published value, and without at least one of the listed visual references being acquired. A crew may therefore legally descend to look, assess, and go around. The rule relies on judgement rather than prior prohibition.

For commercial air transport, scheduled or on demand, the barrier does exist, but it is set elsewhere: the final approach segment is not begun when the transmitted visibility is below the minimum. The point is therefore not a height, it is a procedural fix. Once that fix has been crossed, the approach may be continued to minimums, exactly as in Europe once one thousand feet has been passed.

The second difference is subtler, and it is the one that carries weight in a report. The American terminal test bears on flight visibility, assessed from the flight deck. The transmitted value opens or closes the door before the fix; at minimums, it is the crew’s estimate that decides, and the text accepts this. The European system, for its part, frames the terminal test in terms of a visual reference acquired and maintained, that is, in identifiable lighting elements, not an estimated distance. Two crews landing in the same conditions will therefore not record the same thing: one will have judged a distance, the other will have recognised lights.

The two barriers side by side

Set side by side, the two constructions resemble each other more than is usually said. They share the mechanics — a transmitted value that governs up to a point, then a visual test — and diverge on only three parameters: the location of the point, the nature of the value, and the scope of operations concerned. The table below should be read row by row: each row is a question a crew genuinely asks itself during the descent.

Position of the two barriers on the approach profileSide view of a final approach descending toward the threshold. The American barrier is placed at the final approach fix, further from the threshold and higher up. The European barrier is placed at one thousand feet above the aerodrome, closer to the threshold. The decision altitude lies downstream of both.direction of flightUS barrierfinal fixEU barrier1,000 ft AGLDA/MDA
The American barrier closes earlier; the European barrier closes later and lower. The final approach fix is typically further from the threshold than the point at one thousand feet above the aerodrome, which falls a little beyond three miles on a three-degree glidepath. The gap amounts to tens of seconds of flight, exactly where transmissions follow one another in quick succession.
The two barriers compared, from the switch-over point to the final test
Element European system, commercial air transport American system, scheduled and on-demand commercial transport
Binding value before the point Runway visual range transmitted for the intended runway; converted visibility only when unavailable Transmitted visibility, with runway visual range taking precedence as soon as it is transmitted for the runway
Switch-over point One thousand feet above the aerodrome, whatever procedure is flown Entry into the final approach segment, hence a fix specific to the procedure
Value received before the point Requires not beginning, or discontinuing Requires not beginning the final segment
Value received after the point No effect: continuation authorised to minimums No effect: continuation authorised to minimums
Test at minimums Required visual reference, obtained then maintained Flight visibility at least equal to the published visibility, plus a visual reference from the list
Non-commercial operations Wording specific to each subpart: check it, it is not uniform No barrier on the transmitted value; only the minimums lock remains
Transmitted ceiling Does not generally condition beginning a straight-in approach; becomes determinant again for a circling manoeuvre Same logic: visibility governs the straight-in approach, the ceiling returns to the reasoning for the circling manoeuvre
Document that sets the binding detail Approved operations manual Approved operations specifications

One detail in the table deserves to be highlighted, because it catches out crews coming from business aviation: the row on non-commercial operations. An American pilot used to no transmitted value ever stopping them from attempting the approach discovers, on moving to a commercial air transport certificate, a constraint they had never encountered. The reverse move also exists, and it is more dangerous: believing that the absence of a barrier equals permission, when the minimums lock, for its part, has never moved.

What the difference changes during the descent

Let’s start with geometry, because it is measurable. On a three-degree glidepath, one thousand feet above the aerodrome lies a little beyond three miles from the threshold. The final approach fix is typically further out. The American barrier therefore closes earlier in the descent than the European barrier, by a distance that translates into tens of seconds of flight. It is not huge, but it is exactly the interval during which transmissions follow one another: the controller’s latest RVR, activation or not of low-visibility procedures, a change of runway in use.

A pilot in a cockpit during a nighttime approach in heavy rain, with illuminated instrument displays and runway lights visible through the rain-streaked windshield.
Weather conditions can force critical decisions during landing.
Who governs, and how far, in each systemTwo parallel timelines following the descent. On the European timeline, the transmitted value is binding up to one thousand feet above the aerodrome, after which onboard assessment takes over. On the American timeline, the switch-over happens earlier, at the final approach fix. Minimums are marked at the same point on both timelines.direction of descentEurope1,000 ft AGLUnited Statesfinal fixminimumsthe transmitted value binds the crewonboard assessment decides
The solid line measures the portion of the descent where a transmission can still stop you. It is longer in Europe, shorter in the United States. Beyond the switch-over, no announced value changes the right to continue: only what the crew obtains at minimums counts.

Next comes the question of the moment at which the value is checked. Under the European regime, the value that counts is the one you hold at the moment of passing one thousand feet: the point generally falls after final configuration, at a relatively calm moment. Under the American regime, it is the one you hold at entry into the final segment, that is, in the middle of the configuration sequence and checklist. The same check does not therefore fall at the same point in the workload, which explains why airlines do not call it at the same moment.

It is also worth knowing exactly what is meant by “transmitted”. Aerodrome information recorded an hour earlier does not describe the runway now; a value given by the controller does. Both systems reason on what has been communicated to you, and a value you have not received is not binding on you — which obviously does not license failing to listen. Conversely, a received value does not disappear because it is unwelcome: it is the last transmission before the point that is authoritative.

A last point, often misunderstood in mixed crews: operating rules generally follow the operator’s certificate, not the country overflown. A European operator landing on the other side of the Atlantic carries its one-thousand-foot barrier with it; an American operator landing in Europe applies its operations specifications. It is air traffic procedures that fall under the State of the aerodrome. The operator’s manual settles the matter, and it is worth knowing exactly where it does so.

The trap. It works both ways. The first is continuing while telling yourself you are “almost there” when the value dropped before the switch-over point: proximity to the threshold creates no right, and a value received at one thousand two hundred feet closes the door just as surely as at ten miles. The second, more insidious, is discontinuing a perfectly legal approach because a degraded RVR arrives after the point: you then trade a go-around briefed at minimums for an improvised manoeuvre in landing configuration, at low height, with a surprised crew. Both errors come from the same cause: not knowing precisely where the point is, and not having called it.

The right reflex. Make the switch-over point a call, just like the decision height. At the briefing, state three things: the required minimum value, the binding RVR position, and the exact point where the value will stop counting. In flight, at that point, a crew member announces the value retained and its source — “barrier, six hundred at the touchdown zone, transmitted by control.” The value is then frozen, and the rest of the flight has only one remaining question to deal with: the visual reference. This call costs a few seconds and removes the most costly discussion in the job: the one held at five hundred feet.

The grey areas neither system closes

The sensor, first. When the touchdown zone position is unavailable, the approved documentation indicates which other position becomes binding, and under what conditions. This is not the crew’s choice, nor is it automatic: certain low-minima operations are simply no longer available when a position is missing. The question arises quickly in practice, because a sensor out of service is only noticed when it is needed.

Variable values, next. When the transmission gives a range, or when the positions diverge markedly, the value retained is neither the most favourable of the set nor a hoped-for average: it is the one the documentation designates. In the absence of explicit guidance, prudence dictates retaining the lowest, and not basing a decision on an upward trend that nothing guarantees will hold for thirty seconds.

Ground service, lastly, is often forgotten. An aerodrome does not necessarily deliver the required measurement and protection at all times: activation of low-visibility procedures conditions the protection of sensitive areas and, with it, the effective availability of the lowest minima. A compliant RVR at a facility that has not activated these procedures does not open the same approach to you. This is an aerodrome datum, not an aircraft datum, and it appears in neither of the two texts on the approach ban.

Two moving subjects remain. The circling manoeuvre, first, where the ceiling again becomes a determinant factor, whereas it does not generally condition beginning a straight-in approach. Enhanced vision systems, next: depending on the approval held, they change what is admitted as a visual reference at minimums, without however erasing the question of the value transmitted before the switch-over point. Confusing the two barriers is the classic error when an airline introduces these systems into line operations.

What you need to go and read in your own documentation

None of the above replaces reading your manual, and five points deserve to be located once and for all, manual in hand:

  • the exact wording of the switch-over point, and its associated call in the operator’s standard procedure;
  • the list of binding RVR positions according to the type of approach, including the substitution cases when a position is missing;
  • the visibility conversion table, its coefficients and, above all, its three prohibitions on use;
  • any internal policy more restrictive than the regulation — many operators prohibit themselves from beginning an approach below a given value, whatever the regulation allows;
  • the rule applicable when you operate outside the airspace of your issuing authority, which is rarely found in the same place as the rest.

For anyone preparing a type rating or a change of regime, this subject falls into the category of habits that must be unlearned, not knowledge that must be added. The call moves, the word “visibility” changes meaning, and muscle memory works against you during the first line checks. This is typically the kind of point that benefits from being discussed with colleagues who come from the other system, on the FL330 professional forum, rather than discovered on a foggy evening.

One area remains that no one will close for you: between the moment a value is measured on the ground and the moment it reaches you, a delay elapses that neither the European nor the American text quantifies. The rule reasons on what has been transmitted to you, never on what is actually happening on the runway at the instant of the switch-over point. This imprecision is accepted; it is the price of simplicity, and it explains why both systems retain, come what may, a visual barrier at minimums.

The applicable regulation, your operator’s approved specifications or operations manual, and the aerodrome documentation take precedence over this article, which is purely explanatory and must not be used as an operational reference.

Questions fréquentes

The runway visual range drops below the minimum just before one thousand feet: what should be done?

The value received before the switch-over point is binding, regardless of proximity to the threshold. The approach cannot be continued: you discontinue and fly the planned track, the published go-around or a level-off depending on the situation. Nothing prevents resuming an approach later if a subsequent transmission brings the value back up to or above the minimum.

Can an American commercial air transport operator begin an approach with an announced visibility below minima?

It may fly the approach up to the final approach fix, but it may not begin the final segment while the transmitted visibility remains below the minimum. The barrier applies to entry into the final segment, not to the start of the procedure. Once that fix has been crossed, an announced deterioration no longer requires discontinuing.

Can an American private pilot descend to minimums despite an announced zero visibility?

Under the basic federal rules, no transmitted value prohibits them from beginning or continuing the approach. However, they may not descend below the decision altitude or the minimum descent altitude without flight visibility at least equal to the published value and without a visual reference from the regulatory list. In practice, the manoeuvre ends in a go-around, and limitations specific to the owner, the insurer, or the flight manual may prohibit it well beforehand.

Which value should be retained when the runway visual range is announced as variable?

The value retained is the one designated by the operator’s approved documentation for the binding position, at the time of the check. It is neither the upper bound of the range nor an average. In the absence of clear guidance, prudence dictates retaining the lowest value and not basing the decision on an improving trend.

Does a European operator landing in the United States apply the one-thousand-foot barrier?

Generally yes: operating rules follow the operator’s certificate, while air traffic procedures fall under the State of the aerodrome. The approved operations manual specifies this point and any differences applicable in certain airspaces. It should be checked before the flight rather than inferred by analogy with the destination country.

Does converted visibility allow crossing the barrier when no runway visual range is transmitted?

Yes, but only when no runway visual range is transmitted, using the coefficients of the approved table and within the limits of use it sets. It is not used for take-off, it is superseded as soon as a runway visual range becomes available, and it ceases to be admitted below a threshold of around eight hundred metres. Beyond these limits, only the instrumental measurement counts.

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