Two aircraft fly the same arrival, both within a few dozen metres of the coded path, both with healthy equipment. One of them is capable of telling its crew the moment it stops being that accurate. The other is not, and never was. That capability, not the accuracy figure printed in the designation, is the whole of what separates a required navigation performance specification from an area navigation one — and it decides what happens in the only situation that matters, the one where something has quietly gone wrong.
The designation says accuracy; the specification says more
Performance-based navigation replaced specifying equipment with specifying performance. An airspace designer no longer writes « carry two inertial systems and a distance measuring receiver ». They write the name of a navigation specification, and the operator works out what will meet it.
The names look almost identical on either side of the divide. RNAV 1 and RNP 1 both carry the same lateral accuracy value: the total system error must remain within one nautical mile of the intended path for at least ninety-five per cent of the flight time. If accuracy were the difference, the two designations would be redundant. They are not redundant, because an RNP specification adds a requirement that an RNAV specification does not contain: on-board performance monitoring and alerting. The aircraft must watch its own navigation performance and tell the crew when it can no longer be trusted to deliver what the airspace assumes.
Everything else follows from that one clause. It determines what separation a controller can apply, what happens when a satellite constellation degrades, whether a procedure can be designed with obstacles close to the path, and whether the correct response to a problem is a system message or a suspicion.
RNP means the plane tells you if it’s losing accuracy. RNAV doesn’t. That’s the real difference, not just the numbers.
What the monitoring actually watches — and what it does not
The phrase « navigation performance » hides three different errors that add up to the deviation an observer on the ground would measure. Separating them is the single most useful thing a crew can do with this subject, because they are detected by completely different means.
| Component | What it is | What watches it | What happens when it goes wrong |
|---|---|---|---|
| Path definition error | The difference between the path coded in the navigation database and the path the procedure designer published | The aeronautical data chain: the coding standard, the supplier’s quality system, and your own comparison against the chart | The aircraft flies a wrong path with a healthy system, perfect indications and no alert of any kind |
| Flight technical error | The difference between the coded path and where the aircraft is actually flown | The autopilot, and the crew through the lateral and vertical deviation displays | Visible deviation, generally with no automatic alert; the deviation indication is the instrument |
| Navigation system error | The difference between the position the aircraft believes it occupies and the one it actually occupies | The navigation system itself — this, and only this, is what RNP monitoring and alerting addresses | An alert, if the specification in force requires one |
Read the right-hand column downwards and the practical consequence appears. On-board monitoring and alerting covers one of those three components. It is the one a human being cannot detect unaided, which is exactly why it was worth automating — but it leaves the other two to the crew, and both of them are capable of putting an aeroplane somewhere it should not be while every indication in front of you remains green.
The path definition case deserves particular attention because it is counter-intuitive. The flight management system compares itself with the database. It has no knowledge of the chart. A miscoded waypoint, a leg type that does not match the published procedure, a temporary chart amendment that has not reached your cycle — none of these produce an alert, and all of them are consistent with a perfect navigation performance display. The comparison of the coded route against the chart during the briefing is not administrative box-ticking. It is the only defence that exists against a whole class of error.
An Airbus A320 flying RNAV 10 to a waypoint miscoded as a fly-by instead of a fly-over. The plane follows the wrong path with no alert, because the database error isn’t detected by RNP monitoring.
The ninety-five per cent figure, and the number underneath it
The accuracy value in a designation is a ninety-five per cent value, which means that by construction the aircraft is allowed to be outside it five per cent of the time. That surprises people the first time they meet it, and it is the reason the accuracy figure alone cannot support an airspace design.
The alerting requirement is built on a different and much more demanding idea. It is framed around twice the accuracy value: the system must raise an alert when the probability of the total system error exceeding twice the designated value becomes greater than a very small threshold, on the order of one in a hundred thousand. That second figure, not the ninety-five per cent one, is the one that shapes how close a procedure designer may run a route to terrain, to another route, or to protected airspace. Approach specifications requiring specific authorisation tighten the same construct considerably; the exact formulations belong in the PBN Manual and in the design criteria applied by the State concerned.
This is also why the monitoring is expressed in the flight deck as an uncertainty rather than as an error. Whether it is called actual navigation performance, estimated position uncertainty or estimated position error depending on the manufacturer, the displayed quantity is a statement about how well the system believes it knows where it is. Compared against the value the current segment demands, it yields a binary answer to a single question: is the accuracy the airspace assumes still available.
The specifications, and the one whose name lies
The catalogue is smaller than it looks, and it is organised by phase of flight rather than by equipment.

| Specification | Typical use | On-board monitoring and alerting | Worth knowing |
|---|---|---|---|
| RNAV 5 | En-route continental | No | One of the earliest of the family; historically met by conventional infrastructure as well as by satellite |
| RNAV 1 and RNAV 2 | Departures, arrivals, en-route | No | Accuracy comes from the infrastructure; integrity comes from the crew and from air traffic surveillance |
| RNAV 10, still designated « RNP 10 » | Oceanic and remote | No | The designation was retained for historical reasons. The name says RNP; the specification contains no monitoring requirement |
| RNP 4 and RNP 2 | Oceanic and remote; RNP 2 also continental en-route | Yes | Supports reduced separation minima, which is the operational reason the monitoring is demanded |
| RNP 1 | Terminal areas, frequently where surveillance coverage is absent | Yes | The monitoring stands in where there is no controller’s radar picture |
| RNP APCH | Approach, with LNAV, LNAV/VNAV, LP and LPV minima lines | Yes | The final segment works to a tighter lateral value than the en-route specifications |
| RNP AR APCH | Approach requiring specific authorisation | Yes, with a more demanding construct | Radius-to-fix legs, reduced obstacle clearance, dedicated crew training and aircraft qualification |
| Advanced RNP | Multiple phases under one approval | Yes | Adds scalable values and additional required functions such as radius-to-fix legs |
The third line is the trap that catches experienced crews. RNAV 10 kept the name RNP 10 because re-designating charts, approvals and operations specifications across the world’s oceanic airspace would have cost more than the confusion was judged to be worth. The result is a specification whose designation announces a monitoring capability it does not require. If you fly oceanic sectors, the practical question is not what the airspace is called but what your aircraft actually does when its position estimate degrades — and for RNP 10 operations the answer is usually that inertial drift is managed by time limits rather than by any alert.
The trap. Reading « RNP » in a designation as a promise that the aeroplane will tell you when something is wrong. It is a promise in most cases and a historical artefact in one important one. The reliable question is never the name on the chart, it is whether your aircraft’s approval and equipment provide monitoring and alerting for the segment you are flying now.
Where the integrity comes from, and what it cannot see
For satellite-based operations, the monitoring rests on integrity provided either by the receiver itself, comparing redundant measurements for consistency, or by an augmentation system. That is why an availability prediction is required before certain operations, why the loss of a satellite in a particular geometry can remove a capability you had ten minutes ago, and why the equipment section of a minimum equipment list has a great deal to say about which procedures remain available.
The limits of that construction have become an operational subject rather than a theoretical one. Interference denying the signal is the benign case: the receiver loses integrity, the system says so, and the monitoring works exactly as designed. The difficult case is a coherent false picture. Consistency checking among satellites cannot distinguish a constellation that agrees because it is correct from one that agrees because it has been made to agree. The aircraft then reports excellent performance while being confidently wrong, and reports from several regions in recent years have made this a briefing item rather than a curiosity.
The defence is the same one that predates satellite navigation: an independent source. Inertial position, conventional radio aids where they exist, ground surveillance, and the simple reasonableness check of a track and a timing against a chart. On-board monitoring answers the question « do I know my position well enough ». It has never answered the question « is my position being falsified », and no amount of confidence in the display changes that.
What degradation looks like, and what it obliges
The value of monitoring is not that it prevents degradation. It is that it converts a silent condition into a stated one, which changes the crew’s problem from detection to decision.
| What you see | What it means | What it obliges |
|---|---|---|
| The estimated uncertainty exceeds the value required by the segment, with the associated message | The system no longer guarantees the accuracy the airspace assumes | Advise air traffic control, expect vectors or a conventional means, and do not continue a procedure on the hope that it will recover |
| Satellite integrity lost; position reverts to inertial or conventional updating | The position is now maintained by a source whose error grows with time | The time limits and equipment conditions in your operations manual take effect from that moment |
| No alert, but visible lateral or vertical deviation | This is flight technical error or path definition error, not navigation system error, and the monitoring is content | The deviation display and the chart are the instruments; the absence of a message is not an argument |
| Excellent indicated performance in an area with known interference | The monitoring can be satisfied by a coherent false picture | Cross-check against an independent source before accepting the position, and treat the absence of an alert as uninformative |
The controller’s side of this matters too. Separation minima applied in remote and oceanic airspace are built on the navigation specification in force, so an aircraft that can no longer meet it is not merely inconvenienced, it has changed the assumptions under which everyone around it is being separated. That is why standard phraseology exists to advise inability to meet a required navigation performance, and why the call is made early rather than after the situation has been resolved internally.
Why the same chart is not the same operation everywhere
Two further sources of confusion are worth naming. The first is charting. Approach charts that once carried titles referring to area navigation and satellite receivers are being retitled to name the navigation specification directly, and States are moving through that transition at very different speeds. A crew flying across several regions in a month will see both conventions, sometimes for the same runway on different chart suppliers.
The second is authorisation. In the European system, most navigation specifications are now flown without a dedicated specific approval, the notable exception being approach operations requiring authorisation, which retain a full approval process covering aircraft, crew training and procedures. The United States organises the same result differently, through operations specifications and letters of authorisation issued to the operator. The outcome is broadly comparable and the paperwork is not, which matters to anyone reading a foreign operator’s documentation or moving between systems.
What this changes in a briefing
The useful reduction of all of the above is short. Name the specification for the segment. Say whether it brings monitoring with it. State the value the segment demands and where it is displayed. Agree what the deviation limit is and what you will do at it. Then compare the coded route against the chart, because that comparison covers the error that no alert will ever catch.
The right habit. Brief the degradation, not just the procedure. « If we lose it here, we go to this minima line, or we take vectors, and we tell them now » takes eight seconds on the ground and removes the worst thirty seconds in the air. Navigation modules covering the same ground in more depth sit in the operations section of FL330 training.
The distinction between the two families of specification is finally a distinction about honesty. An area navigation specification asks the aircraft to be accurate. A required navigation performance specification asks it to be accurate and to admit when it is not. Airspace designers, controllers and procedure designers all build on the second promise, which is why it costs more equipment and more approval — and why knowing which of the two you are operating under is worth rather more than knowing the number printed beside it.

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